The Institute of Development Studies is one of the world's leading organisations for research, teaching and communications on international development. Founded in 1966, the Institute enjoys an international reputation based on the quality of its work and the rigour with which it applies academic skills to real world challenges. Its purpose is to understand and explain the world, and to try to change it -to influence as well as to inform.
Introduction
The international community has been, over the last two decades, developing a holistic approach to development that stresses the linkage between security, good governance and economic development. The idea that drives this triangular approach is that development can only be achieved in a secure and democratic environment, conducive to long-term investments. This evolution can be traced back to the early 1990s, when political conditionality was added to what were formerly essentially economic development programmes (Robinson 1993) . Shortly thereafter, a security dimension was added to the 'good governance-economic development' nexus, which came with a new diagnosis. It is now assumed that conflict and under-development are rooted in state failure and that in order to prevent future crises, state weakness must be addressed through broad institutional reforms. The international community thus attempts to 'bring the state back in', 1 i.e. to re-establish its authority through capacity-building reforms.
The risks and limits entailed by this type of holistic approach are increasingly highlighted. Some argue, in particular, that the merging of development and security programmes is likely to promote a more military-based approach to development programmes, thus underlining the growing risk that traditional military assistance be included in development budgets (Châtaigner 2004; Duffield 2001) . Others question the uncritically accepted link between democracy and political stability, insisting that democratisation often brings about instability and can thus jeopardise a state's developmental strategy (Mansfield and Snyder 1995) .
In spite of such reservations, the above-described understanding of the links between development, good governance and security clearly informs the European Union's policy agenda in Africa. Through the so-called 'multi-functional approach' outlined in the European Security Strategy 2 -the so-called 'Solana Document', adopted in December 2003 -the EU is also promoting a holistic approach, where security, economic development and democracy are seen as essential contributions to the generation of political stability in the EU's international environment. In doing so, the EU positions itself as a major actor on the international scene, one that can propose a multi-dimensional approach to crisis management and therefore claim the status of international power (Bretherton and Vogler 1999; Piening 1997; Soeterdorp 1999) . The EU insists on its added value as a multi-institutional organisation likely to provide all types of crisis management tools -civilian and military as well as humanitarian -within a unique framework. Because of the multiplicity of the problems it is facing -war, poverty, humanitarian catastrophes, etc. -the African continent fits with this multi-functional approach.
This case study of the EU security policy in Africa shows that the linkage between security, governance and development relies for a large part on institutional dynamics. This paper will therefore focus on these dynamics and on the bureaucratic affiliations of the concerned EU actors, notwithstanding the fact that the EU's security agenda in Africa is also clearly determined by African realities. African security can be seen as a field where EU actors are improving their institutional capacities: in fact, EU African security policy is often driven by internal power relations. The importance of these institutional dynamics can be seen through a threefold process:
First, African security is a field likely to provide a new legitimacy for development policies led by the European Community (EC), which is responsible for the management of first pillar 3 activities;
Second, African security is a field of experimentation for the institutional actors responsible for the definition and implementation of the CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy) -the so-called second pillar;
Third, African security is a field of Europeanisation for traditionally bilateral member-state security policies.
In fact, the consistency and the credibility of the EU security policy in Africa will depend on the convergence between these three processes.
2 African security, a field of relegitimisation for the European Commission?
For some years now, a discourse that emphasises the role of security as a precondition for development has emerged within the EU's community institutions.
The first EU document focusing on African conflicts was proposed by the Commission (European Commission 1996a) and promoted the notion of 'structural stability', which underlined the key role played by development in the prevention and regulation of African conflicts. Increasing involvement in African conflict management issues constitutes a means for the Commission and its Directorate General Development (DG Dev), to respond to the doubts expressed about the efficiency of its development strategies in Africa (European Commission 1996b , and the general validity of development aid (Lister 1998a) . Sub-Saharan Africa is increasingly perceived as a difficult field for the promotion of economic and social development through aid. This explains the growing attention given to conflict prevention and management through military means (Olsen 2002) . This security angle in the approach to development is determined by the interests of some Directorates General (DGs) within the Commission -DG Dev, in particular 4 -in defending their privileged geographic area of intervention and investing in a functional field in which they do not traditionally intervene. From the early 2000s, the EC has thus been entering into the African security field on tiptoes, through the politicisation and securitisation of its development policy.
Politicisation and securitisation of EC policies
Whereas in the past relations between the EU and sub-Saharan Africa had long been reduced to the sole issues of trade and development cooperation through the Yaoundé and subsequent Lomé partnership agreements between the EU and the Africa-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) group of states (GEMDEV 2000) , 5 nowadays they are being increasingly politicised and securitised as was apparent in the two last Lomé agreements and their successor, the Cotonou Agreement, signed in 2000. 6 The adoption, by the EU, of the comprehensive approach that links good governance and development is evident in the Cotonou Agreement. Human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law are defined as 'essential elements' in the Cotonou Agreement: a violation of any of these elements may lead to a suspension of EU assistance and trade cooperation with the concerned ACP country. 7 Meanwhile, the very first article of the Cotonou Agreement closes the 11 IDS WORKING PAPER 284 4 DG Dev often tends to consider Africa as its 'exclusive territory'. See Dimier (2002 Dimier ( , 2003 .
5
Some have even considered aid programmes to be a cornerstone in the European integration process (Lister 1998b ).
6
It is important here to put the stress on the EU institutional sharing of responsibility. While the Council is responsible for negotiating international treaties, the Commission is in charge of implementing the community elements of these treaties. The Commission, however, also enjoys a power of initiative and often designs the treaties. This is especially the case of the EU-ACP agreements, which the Commission's DG Dev and, since the Cotonou Agreement, DG Trade are in charge of managing and implementing.
7
The Council actually wanted to add 'good governance' to the list of essential elements, but was opposed here by the ACP countries that felt that the three essential elements already covered the most important aspects of good governance and that its inclusion could lead to arbitrary decisions. Good governance, therefore, is a 'fundamental element', i.e. with the exception of serious cases of corruption, a state facing governance problems will be offered support and advice to improve its performance. development-good governance-security triangle by underlining that the agreement was concluded 'with a view to contributing to peace and security and to promoting a stable and democratic political environment', 8 thus emphasising the third dimension -security.
The real innovation in the Cotonou Agreement, however, is the introduction of a 'political dialogue' between the EU and the ACP in article 8, 9 which should 'contribute to peace, security and stability and promote a stable and democratic political environment'. After five years of implementation and some criticism, the mid-term revision of the Cotonou Agreement, in 2005, allowed for some adjustments. It was thought, in particular, that the preventive dimension of the 'political dialogue' as defined in article 8 was underused. Under the revised Cotonou Agreement, the dialogue should be held before the consultation procedure provided by article 96 10 of the same agreement can be launched. This amendment clearly strengthens the political dimension of the Cotonou Agreement, while the provision for a systematic dialogue with each partner country in effect complements the work of the EU special representatives (EUSR) sent to troubled regions and thus draws a link with the CFSP dimension of the EU's relations with Africa. 11 The assistance provided to partner countries is increasingly political rather than purely technical and the concept of rule of law clearly drives some of the reforms advocated in the Cotonou Agreement. 12
The principles set in the Cotonou agreement are accompanied by more concrete policies and instruments. The European Commission classifies its conflict prevention Through dialogue, the Parties shall contribute to peace, security and stability and promote a stable and democratic political environment. It shall encompass cooperation strategies as well as global and sectoral policies, including environment, gender, migration and questions related to the cultural heritage. (4) The dialogue shall focus, inter alia, on specific political issues of mutual concern or of general significance for the attainment of the objectives of this Agreement, such as the arms trade, excessive military expenditure, drugs and organised crime, or ethnic, religious or racial discrimination. The dialogue shall also encompass a regular assessment of the developments concerning the respect for human rights, democratic principles, the rule of law and good governance. (5) Broadly based policies to promote peace and to prevent, manage and resolve violent conflicts shall play a prominent role in this dialogue, as shall the need to take full account of the objective of peace and democratic stability in the definition of priority areas of cooperation.
10 An Article 96 procedure can be launched if a party to the agreement -the European Community and the member states of the European Union or an ACP state -considers that the other party has failed to fulfil an obligation stemming from respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law. This consultation procedure can lead to the adoption of 'appropriate measures' and, as a last resort, to a suspension of the agreement (Mackie and Zinke 2005) .
11 The EUSRs promote the CFSP in troubled regions and countries and play an active role in efforts to consolidate peace, stability and the rule of law. They report to the Secretary-General of the Council of the EU and High Representative for the CFSP (SG/HR). and peace-building efforts into two categories: direct and indirect initiatives. Direct initiatives range from humanitarian activities to support for conflict resolution initiatives and institutional reforms, while indirect initiatives refer to the mainstreaming of conflict prevention objectives into sector programmes, from development to trade.
Among direct initiatives are the humanitarian actions led by DG ECHO. 13 Humanitarian action is a shared competence, but it is implemented by the Commission's institutions, and more precisely by DG ECHO, which enjoys an important latitude within the Commission, while its impartiality is established in article 7 of the humanitarian aid regulation. 14 In fact, the policies managed by ECHO are far from politicised. DG ECHO strictly defines humanitarian assistance as an apolitical, neutral and impartial activity: DG ECHO is not part of the 'crisis management' system and is therefore not a crisis management instrument, as the humanitarian policy does not aim to stabilise a political situation nor to prevent a crisis and can therefore not be considered a political instrument.
Direct initiatives also comprise early warning and action mechanisms. The Commission, its geographic desks and in-country delegations, are asked to closely monitor the political situation in all countries to deliver assessments based on a list of root causes of conflict. 15 These assessments are then used, by the General Secretariat of the Council and the Commission, to prepare a watch-list of countries at the start of each Presidency. In addition, risk factors are to be taken into account during the drafting of the Commission's Country Strategy Papers 16 so as to ensure a coordinated approach to conflict prevention. Indirect initiatives essentially focus on the acknowledgement and integration of security concerns within other policy fields, such as development and trade. The Commission thus acknowledges that development and trade policies need to be carefully designed and implemented if they are to both provide economic prosperity and ensure political stability. Of particular significance here are the efforts to regulate the trade of particular goods fuelling violent conflicts. The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, 21 that aims to prevent the trade of so-called 'blood diamonds', and the EU Action Plan for Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT), 22 which regulates the trade of timber, are two cases in point. The EU's efforts do not stop with its import activities, however: Europe has also shown signs that it was ready to take responsibility as an exporting region, especially with regard to weapons. Article 11 of the Cotonou Agreement underlines the partners' willingness to address the issue of landmines and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW). 23
The EC, a unified actor?
The intermingling of fields in conflict prevention and management policies requires close coordination between the different branches of the Commission. In fact, unclear divisions of labour are problematic inside the Commission, between its different sectors and directorates general (DGs). In the name of mainstreaming, DG Trade and DG Dev are asked, for instance, to carefully take into account the conflict prevention precautions pointed out by DG Relex. It is obvious, however, that these DGs often pursue different, or even contradictory, objectives. DG Trade will want to defend the EU's commercial interests, DG Relex will be careful to increase the EU's security, external relations and international visibility, while DG Dev should contribute to increased prosperity in the ACP states.
The EU's current commitment in favour of regional integration illustrates the difficulty of coordinating and reconciling these different objectives. While African sub-regional organisations are increasingly considered key in the African security architecture and the strengthening of their conflict prevention and management capabilities is increasingly supported, the Cotonou Agreement foresees the establishment of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the EU and ACP regional organisations. At first sight, these two objectives would seem consistent. Some observers, however, underline that they may lead to very contradictory results. The official rationale behind the EPAs is to enhance regional integration in the ACP so as to integrate the economies of the ACP countries into the world economy. One of the principal aims of these EPAs, however, is also to submit EU-ACP trade relations to World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules, and to suppress the non-reciprocal trade arrangements that long prevailed between the EU and the ACP. External observers and representatives of the ACP states have already, on numerous occasions, underlined the risks entailed by a rushed-in liberalisation and regionalisation of trade in the ACP countries (Gibb 2000; Ochieng 2005 ). The trade liberalisation entailed by the EPAs may indeed create more ground for conflict than is openly admitted: the changes in commodity prices that it triggers can exacerbate livelihood insecurity, while making it more difficult to control the flow of arms or conflict resources. The EC's willingness to pursue EPA negotiations in spite of these objections casts some doubt on its capacity to reconcile its different interests and institutions.
The Community pillar is not, finally, exempt from the interplay of national interests. Member-states, and France in particular, 24 do not hesitate to emphasise their contribution to the European Development Fund (EDF) within the EDF Committee 25 to favour the one or the other programme. They can also push forward their national interests through the presence of their European civil servants within the Commission. Belgian European civil servants, for instance, are important actors in the EU policy in Africa 26 and can sometimes be seen, especially within DG Dev, as promoting Belgium's national interests.
3 African security, a field for testing out for the European Security and Defence Policy?
A number of documents and instruments adopted over the last few years illustrate the second pillar's growing interest in and concern for Africa's security problems, as well as its desire to become increasingly involved in their resolution. A major step was made with the adoption, in May 2001, of the Council Common Position concerning conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa. 27 This common position developed at length an element that would thereafter constitute one of the essential bases of the EU's security strategy in Africa, i.e. the idea of an increased multilateralism through a strengthening both of the capabilities of African regional organisations and of the EU's partnership with these organisations and with the United Nations (UN). This principle of multilateral cooperation is also emphasised in the European Security Strategy.
Although all these documents in theory provide a clear framework that could enhance the coordination of the European member-states' activities in Africa, most of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) proposals still lack a practical translation. The clearest signs of the latter are the appointments of special representatives of the EU or of the Presidency to specific parts of Africa, 28 but these appointments are still made on an ad hoc basis and cannot, therefore, be interpreted as a systematic 'diplomaticisation' of the EU's presence in Africa. The CFSP therefore remains highly inconsistent, which partly accounts for the fact that the EU has increasingly invested in the development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), perceived as a more straightforward policy field.
Africa, a field of validation for the CFSP/ESDP means and procedures
The field of conflict prevention and management in Africa constitutes an ideal field for testing out and validating (Bagayoko 2004a) In response to a crisis, or to an urgent request by the UN, the EU should be able to undertake two battlegroup-size operations for a period of up to 120 days simultaneously. Forces should be on the ground no later than 10 days after the EU decision to launch the operation. Larger member states will generally contribute their own battlegroups, while smaller members are expected to create common groups. Each group will have a 'framework nation', which will take operational command, based on the model set up during the Operation Artemis.
36 The battlegroups will be -although not exclusively -available for autonomous operations, in response to UN requests for participation in Chapter VII operations. The European battlegroup concept is therefore developed in coordination with the UN Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) initiative, which plans for brigade-type forces intended for Chapter VI operations. They may also contribute to the rotation of the NATO Response Force (NRF).
37 Taking as a basis the guidelines set by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the EU has now defined the security sector as a system which includes: the core security actors, i.e. armed forces, police, gendarmeries and paramilitary forces, intelligence and security services; the security management and oversight bodies within the executive and legislative branches and in civil society; the justice and law enforcement institutions; and the non-statutory forces such as liberation or guerrilla armies, private security companies and political party militias. Security Sector Reform (SSR) seeks to increase the ability of a state to meet the range of both internal and external security needs in a manner consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, human rights, transparency and the rule of law. SSR involves addressing issues of how mission, led in Darfur (Sudan), was meant to show that the EU is also able to implement at the operational level its partnership with the AU. The EU civilianmilitary supporting action to AMIS II, the AU's mission in Darfur, provides the AU with political, military and technical assistance, military observers, equipment, strategic transportation and training. 40 In 2004 the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) Action Plan for Africa 41 was adopted, which sets out practical recommendations for the implementation of the EU's contribution to Africa's security.
The last EU operations in Africa illustrate a major trend in ESDP operations: the increasing development of civilian means, thus giving a practical dimension to the civilian side of the ESDP. 42 The introduction of civilian dimensions has led to the transformation of the type of EU involvement in Africa. While the development of ESDP activities in Africa was initially meant to provide rapid reaction means, these operations are in effect increasingly taking on a long-term approach (Gowan 2004 pillar exclusivity, its civilian dimension is necessarily linked to -and, at times, overlaps with -the community pillar's civilian activities.
Unclear division of labour within the second pillar
The European security structures are very young 44 and are therefore all struggling for legitimacy. This legitimacy must be won: first, against external actors, such as NATO (and particularly the US interests within it); second, against older and more experienced EC institutions; third, one against another. The Political and Security Committee (PSC), composed of the member-states' PSC ambassadors, plays a central role in the definition and follow-up of European crisis responses. It provides the political control and strategic direction for the ESDP operations, basing its decisions on the recommendations expressed by the Military Committee (EUMC) and the Committee for civilian aspects of crisis management (CIVCOM). The EUMC is composed of the member-states' military commands; it follows the progress of military operations, makes recommendations to the PSC on all military aspects of the ESDP and gives instructions to the EU Military Staff (EUMS). CIVCOM was created in 2002 to define and supervise civilian operations. It is also in charge of seeing to the inter-pillar coordination of the EU's civilian actions.
To these Council institutions must be added the General Secretariat of the Council (GSC), led by the Secretary-General of the Council of the EU and High Representative for the CFSP (SG/HR), with its directorates general. Among them, the DGE, in charge of external relations, is divided into geographical and functional directorates. The responsibility to coordinate the management of African security issues is at the heart of a competition. If DGE VIII -in charge of defence issueswere tasked with coordinating the activities in Africa, it could gain renewed legitimacy. Indeed, the DGE VIII is currently having some difficulties in imposing its views on the Military Staff, also located within the GSC. Moreover, both DGE VIII and the Military Staff are also competing with NATO. Because the ESDP is comprised of two closely interlinked fields -military and civilian crisis management -the recently established civilian-military cell could also seek the responsibility of trying to coordinate the civilian and military aspects of the EU security policy in Africa. Nevertheless, DGE IX, which is in charge of the civilian aspects of crisis management 45 and has no rivalry with NATO, is perhaps in a better position at the moment: indeed, DGE IX seems to be getting closer and closer to the Commission services -such as DG Dev or DG ECHO -in charge of implementing civilian programmes in the security field.
Finally it is also important to stress the role played by professional interests, which have appeared since the launching of the ESDP. In fact, a new profession has emerged within the traditionally civilian organisation that the EU used to be. The military officers stationed in Brussels are trying to promote both their values (such as symbolic patriotism) and their working methods (such as a culture of planning) as opposed to those of their civilian counterparts (Bagayoko 2006) . Whatever their nationality, they generally feel they have more in common with their military counterparts from other countries than with the European civil servants coming from their own country.
4 African security, a field of Europeanisation for memberstates security policies?
African security issues offer an interesting field, where European member-states can make their security policies meet, interact, coordinate, and in effect, 'Europeanise'. C. Major defines Europeanisation as 'an ongoing, interactive and mutually constitutive process of change linking national and European levels, where the responses of the member-states to the integration process feed back into EU institutions and policy processes and vice versa' (Major 2005) . Through its security policy in sub-Saharan Africa, the EU indeed aims to 'integrate the policies and actions of its member-states' (Ginsberg 1989) . But the launching of a dynamic ESDP in Africa is also the symptom of the Europeanisation strategies of the former colonial powers' traditional African policies and of their capacity to be the driving force for a collective policy on the continent.
EU member-states and African security
Traditionally, most EU member-states do not identify any significant political or economic interest in Africa. Germany, in particular, has long insisted on the necessity to limit the ESDP to the enlarged European space and been hostile to the idea of any EU involvement in the management of Africa's conflicts. But the former colonial powers have been successful in the recent years in generating a growing interest for African security matters among their European partners.
Rather than being a driving force, France has long been an obstacle to the EU's further involvement in African security issues. France's unilateralist policy in Africa acted as a disincentive on other European states, which were reluctant to associate their image and the image of the EU with a policy often considered neo-colonial. France, however, is now increasingly trying to obtain a multilateral legitimacy for its interventions on the continent. The integration of French interventions within the ESDP framework could allow it to remain involved on the African continent -still considered a central asset for France's position on the international scene -while rendering groundless the accusations of paternalism and neo-colonialism. Operation Artemis offered an interesting illustration of the progressive Europeanisation of France's involvement in African crises 46 and proved that European member-states could decide collectively to contribute to a crisis management operation that had been initially wanted by one of them only. Operation Artemis was thus an interesting synthesis of the interests of the EU and one of its member-states, since it reconciled a young ESDP in search of credibility and a former colonial power in search of legitimacy after some deeply contested unilateral interventions. It also enabled France to re-engage in the Great Lakes region and beyond, in Central Africa, from which it had progressively withdrawn since the much criticised Operation Turquoise in Rwanda. Finally, and beyond these central political issues, the Europeanisation of its Africa policy also enables France to share the costs of military and defence cooperation. This desire to rationalise the costs of the French military cooperation first translated into the efforts expended since 1998 towards the emergence of inter-African capabilities of crisis management. This was essentially done through the Programme for the strengthening of African peacekeeping capabilities (RECAMP -Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix), which is based on a regional approach to assistance and lies at the heart of the multilateralisation of the French security policy in Africa. 47 The objective, regularly stressed since 2002, is to make RECAMP 'the operational reference for the ESDP in Africa', i.e. a federative framework for EU member-states' security policies in Africa. 48 The future of RECAMP is more and more linked to France's capacity to convince its European partners to participate in the financing and equipment as well as training of African armies.
The Franco-British rapprochement in Saint-Malo led to both the creation of the ESDP and the Europeanisation of the two countries' African policies, even though EU member-states seem increasingly convinced of the importance of Africa to European security. The rather impressive list of contributing nations to EUFOR RD Congo confirms this. 51 Moreover, some member-states such as the Netherlands or Sweden have in effect recently stepped up their involvement in African security issues. 52 Alongside France and Portugal, Belgium -which recently resumed a more active Africa policy after having largely withdrawn from the African scene following the assassination of ten of its parachutists in Kigali in 1994 53 -is one of the most IDS WORKING PAPER 284 24 49 The ACCP is an interdepartmental mechanism which draws together the conflictprevention resources of the Department for International Development (DFID), Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and Ministry of Defence (MOD).
50
A key part of the UK's long-term strategy to build African conflict management capabilities consists in supporting Security Sector Reform (SSR) projects. The largest British commitment in SSR is in Sierra Leone, where the UK actively supports the reform of the army, the police, the judiciary system, as well as ad hoc institutions such as the Anti-Corruption Commission, the Special Court and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and provides technical assistance to the government of Sierra Leone (see Leboeuf 2005) .
active supporters of a substantial European commitment in Africa. It is followed on this by Spain and Greece.
Disagreements between member-states
Germany's position has considerably evolved, over the last years, from reluctance to a readiness to contribute to short-term ESDP missions, such as EUFOR, whose operational command was provided by Germany. Nevertheless, there is still a lot of reluctance, especially within the German Ministry of Defence, to engage more in Africa. 54 Germany is also very anxious to prevent the EU from taking a neocolonialist turn and imposing its views on its African partners. The new EU member-states, which have no traditional African policy nor specific interest in this geographical area, 55 are generally in favour of reinforcing African capabilities in order to create an autonomous African security system and avoid increasing costs to the EU.
Indeed, funding constitutes a central issue. Their limited defence budgets can lead some countries to favour a European option, in order to see the EU shoulder part of the cost of their African security policy. Some member-states, such as France or Portugal, thus share a strong desire to have access to the Community development cooperation funds, although they are not ready, in exchange for this access to Community funds, to hand over their management of military cooperation to Community actors. This preoccupation can explain why their African security policies are increasingly trying to promote the linkage between security, governance and development, as suggested by the RECAMP concept. 56 Other European partners wish to avoid a situation where some member-states' African policies would be funded by the EU, especially by the EC budget. This financial issue drives Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands, which are particularly cautious when it comes to funding EU security activities in Africa. Most new member-states share this financial concern: they wish to see a fair balance between the structural funds they receive and the development aid dedicated to non-EU states.
Moreover, countries such as Germany and the Nordic countries favour an ethical approach (Châtaigner 2004) and consider that development funds should not be used to finance the ESDP, whose progress they do not consider as crucial as France does. The UK, on the other hand, is already implementing a policy that clearly puts the stress on the linkage between security and development. The British position on the question is therefore not so much driven by ethical concerns as it is by a reluctance to 'Europeanise' a policy that is considered already efficient at the national level.
Finally, the issue of multilateral cooperation with other Western actors is another bone of contention. France's insistence on involving the EU in Africa can be read as an attempt to avoid coordination with other actors, and in particular with NATO and the United States. 57 The UK, on the other hand, insists on the necessity of coordinating EU member-states' activities with non-European actors such as the United States, Canada and Norway. The EU strategy for Africa and the G8 Gleneagles Plan for Africa are viewed as totally interconnected. The British, followed in this by Germany, also promote cooperation between NATO and the EU.
Inter-institutional relations: competition or cooperation?
Each and every new policy paper focusing on the EU's security policy in Africa insists on the necessity of inter-institutional and inter-pillar coordination and mainstreaming. In fact, one of the conditions of success of the European approach to conflict prevention and management in Africa depends on the EU's capacity to overcome the rivalries born out of the different institutions' desire to play the role of a 'lead agency' on these issues. Some of the strategic choices made by the EU in Africa therefore depend on the interests of each department involved in the continent's affairs and are often the result of compromises between these departments. It appears that competition rather than convergence remains the main trend in the EU inter-institutional relations (Allison 1971; Halperin and Kanter 1974; Egeberg 1999) , although some recent evolutions also show that these institutions increasingly share a common vocabulary and approach to African security issues. Frequently, the linkage between security, governance and development is still at the core of the EU inter-institutional competition.
Cross-pillars rivalries
The Commission can have a determining influence over the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) on the African continent (Krause 2003 ) -for example through the implementation of CFSP sanctions adopted by the Council or through the mobilisation of first pillar resources for the implementation of common actions -but also over the implementation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The African Peace Facility (APF) provides an interesting illustration of the institutional issues at stake in the linkage securitydevelopment: it is a good example of the Commission's capacity to encroach on the Council's prerogative over the CFSP and ESDP. The APF is a funding instrument dedicated to financing peacekeeping operations led by African actors. Launched in 2004, the APF was funded from the resources of the 9th European Development Fund (EDF), which is drawn from member-states' voluntary contributions. Although the EDF is not part of the Community budget, the Commission is in charge of managing it, which gives it a determining influence. With regards to the African Peace Facility itself, however, the member-states have the last word. The APF was supposed to be a provisional instrument and its perpetuation created heated debates between member-states and the Commission. Some object that the APF 'diverts' funds that were initially meant for development aid towards security concerns. 58 The issue of the APF also had a concrete impact on the considerable disagreement between the Commission and the member-states over the notion of 'effective ownership' 59 through multilateral cooperation and the terms of its implementation. The debate, in effect, concerned the type of African multilateral organisation (see O'Brien 2000) that should be supported. The use of the African Peace Facility was therefore at the centre of a competition between the Commission, which wanted the APF to focus on support to the AU, 60 and the GSC and some member-states, which wanted these funds to be also -or even exclusively -used to support sub-regional organisations. 61 This debate found a de 58 The member-states discussed four options for the future financing of the APF. According to the first option, which was the one chosen in April 2006, new funds would be allocated to the APF from the current EDF. The second option offered to finance the APF through the CFSP budget under the new financial perspectives for 2007-2013. The role of the Commission would at the very least be reduced, while the European Parliament could control the use of the facility's funds as part of its competence in the CFSP budget. The third option would lead to the creation of a new multi-annual and intergovernmental fund, which would be managed either according to the current APF procedure or through the ATHENA mechanism, currently used for the EU's military operations. This type of fund would most probably be under the sole control of the member-states. According to the fourth option, the part of the APF which focuses on the building of the AU's capabilities could be financed through Commission resources. EU Peacekeeping operations and any other types of EU military activity could not, however, be financed within this framework and the European Parliament's control would be limited to the small EU funds provided for AU activities.
59 The concept of 'effective ownership' -or 'African ownership' -refers to the appropriation, by African partners, of the EU's initiatives, in terms of financial and technical assistance and training, meant to increase their capabilities in conflict prevention, management and resolution. 'Ownership' therefore refers to the idea of 'African solutions to African problems', i.e. that Africans should assume responsibility for their own affairs.
facto -provisional -conclusion when the AU was called upon to intervene in Darfur: the EUR200 million, which were earmarked in the initial APF for peace support operations, were thus nearly exclusively allocated to the AU missions AMIS I and II. 62 The EU agreed, in April 2006, to provide an additional amount of EUR300 million under the 10th EDF to be able to continue the APF for another three-year period (2008) (2009) (2010) . 63 Another example of the EU institutional rivalries over African security is the recent case brought before the Court of Justice of the European Communities, which also underlines the problems entailed by the unclear division of labour between Council and Commission. In February 2005, the Commission, in an action against the Council, accused it of assuming the right to contribute to ECOWAS in the framework of the Moratorium on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW). For the Commission, the Council decision affects Community powers in the field of development aid, since actions against the spread of SALW are already covered by the Cotonou Agreement and the regional indicative programme (RIP) for West Africa. 64
Finally, it is important to underline that inter-institutional rivalries may sometimes also originate in philosophical divergences. The position of DG ECHO is a telling example. As mentioned above, DG ECHO strictly defines humanitarian assistance as an apolitical, neutral and impartial activity: it thus contests that humanitarian missions can be considered as an integral part of the ESDP military missions, as currently defined by the Petersberg tasks. The development of the ESDP has 60 The Commission underlined that the AU had achieved considerable progress at the institutional level, and particularly through the creation of its Peace and Security Council. The AU's Peace and Security Council could be seen as the New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development's (NEPAD) security organ. The Commission's preference for the AU is therefore consistent with the link it has been drawing between development and conflict prevention and management policies.
61 The GSC, spurred on by some member-states, favoured the sub-regional organisations and more particularly the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which actually possessed the necessary operational experience and had started developing the adequate institutional framework (see Nivet 2006). indeed led some, within ECHO, to fear even greater confusion between humanitarian and military actors. These positions explain in large part the near absence of contacts between DG ECHO and the EUMS, the EUMC or the General Secretariat's DGE VIII. DG ECHO rejects the political pressure emanating from the second pillar institutions and denounces what it thinks is a desire to use humanitarian activities for political purposes.
Towards increased cooperation?
The current evolution towards longer missions, with a growing civilian dimensionwhich are more and more dedicated to promoting good governance and sustainable development over the long term -renders essential a tight cooperation between the civilian and military crisis management activities of the second pillar and the traditionally civilian activities of the first pillar. 65 The GSC, the Commission and the EU member-states have recently engaged in common reflections on the EU's policies in the field of African security. A first important document, the EU Strategy for Africa, was jointly designed by the Commission and the GSC and adopted in December 2005. 66 This document defines the EU's general strategy in Africa and therefore goes beyond the sole security aspects. Nevertheless, the very first section of the document deals with 'Peace and Security' and recommends: fostering the African Peace Facility (APF) through a long-term arrangement; building EU engagement in Africa on memberstates' bilateral activities; assisting the AU in implementing the African Standby Force (ASF); providing support to African military and civilian operations (including the deployment of battlegroups); continuing efforts to fight the production and the circulation of small arms and involving Africa in the struggle against terrorism. 67 This broad document, however, did not give way to any practical implementation.
In November 2005, following a French request, 68 the Political and Security Committee (PSC) asked the Commission and the General Secretariat of the Council (GSC) to design a Concept for strengthening African capabilities for the prevention, management and resolution of conflict. This concept seeks to enhance the coordination between the European Community, the second pillar and memberstate activities and promotes three categories of measures: the first category comprises measures meant to strengthen consistency and coordination at the EU level by ensuring coherence between the EU's different institutions, developing a support and coordination structure and ensuring consistency of financial support. The second set of measures focuses on a strengthened partnership with the AU and the sub-regional organisations. The third group of measures, finally, aims to strengthen African capabilities by providing support for the training of African troops; this will probably be done by opening member-states' depots and by turning member-states' training programmes -such as the French RECAMP 69 -into means for delivering EU policies. The PSC made note of the Concept on 29 September 2006 70 and stated that it should be seen as part of the implementation of the EU strategy for Africa. The GSC and the Commission were once again invited to explore and find practical ways of implementing the options proposed in the paper, in cooperation with African partners. Indeed, a number of financial and institutional issues remain unresolved, that underline the disagreements that still oppose member-states 71 as well as the rivalries within and across pillars.
As far as funding is concerned, there is an urgent need to address the absence of harmonisation of the existing financial tools. At the moment, financial resources from member-states have to be mobilised to support African capabilities such as military training, not eligible for funding under the CFSP budget 72 or the African Peace Facility (APF). Some progress has been made since the adoption, in November 2006, of the 'instrument for stability', which aims to ensure a better linkage between short-term crisis response and long-term development instruments. This instrument adopts a comprehensive approach, as it aims to contribute to stability in situations of crisis or emerging crisis and to help build local capacities to address specific global and trans-regional threats and pre-and post-crisis situations, often rooted in bad governance and under-development. Its capacity to solve current funding issues, however, will in great part depend on the interpretation that the EU institutions choose to make of it. While it clearly combines a number of formerly separate instruments, 73 it does not as yet provide a clear perspective on the future of other instruments such as the African Peace Facility. Article 4(3) of the regulation establishing the instrument for stability would nonetheless seem to suggest some ways of complementing, if not replacing, the APF. 74 Certainly, this new instrument will be the object of further inter-institutional negotiations, which will most probably in turn determine its efficiency. Whatever the results of these negotiations, some problems will remain, however: the status of military cooperation, in particular, remains unclear.
The strengthening of the coherence between the EU's different institutions is also a problem which will be hard to deal with. Some member-states have proposed the implementation of a coordination structure that would be both responsible for coordinating bilateral activities of EU member-states and for planning EU activities in Africa. The implementation of such a coordination structure is related to the EU architecture itself: it is interesting to note that a geographical question -security on the African continent -can create functional development at the EU institutional level. At the moment, there is no agreement concerning the institutional situation of this structure. France wishes to promote the establishment of a cell -in effect a European equivalent of the French Military and Defence Cooperation Directorate (Direction de la Coopération Militaire et de Défence -DCMD) -within the GSC, which would be responsible for preparing, coordinating and implementing EU activities in Africa. Other member-states, such as Portugal or the UK, are against the establishment of a rigid permanent coordination structure, particularly if it is supposed to take initiatives, as the concept paper suggests. They support the implementation of a lighter mechanism, e.g. a coordination cell introduced within the Africa Task Force in the Policy Unit which is already bringing together all Africa-related activities. 75
The coordination of member-states training programmes is another issue at stake here. France would like to make the RECAMP concept an operator for EU activities in Africa and extend the 'framework nation' concept to African-European partnerships -France being the natural candidate for this status. This 'framework nation' concept, however, remains to be defined; it is not clear, in particular, how the strategic direction of activities in Africa would be shared between the 'framework nation' and the EU organ in charge of the political control and the strategic direction of EU operations -namely the PSC. Whereas the UK used to insist on how important it was for member-states to keep control over their national programmes, it now seems more willing to collaborate with France.
Conclusion
The EU's security policy in Africa therefore provides an interesting example of the coordination and competition processes within the Community first pillar and within the second pillar and across these pillars. One of the biggest challenges for the EU policy in Africa will most probably be cross-pillar coordination, i.e. the coordination of CFSP/ESDP activities and EC development programmes. Reconciling their objectives is obviously a matter of close coordination and institutional diplomacy. 76 The examples of the African Peace Facility and Instrument for Stability show that devising new instruments alone does not constitute a sufficient response to inconsistencies, and that much depends on ad hoc institutional interpretations and experimentation in the field. Some coordination issues will remain unresolved as long as the documents defining the EU's external relations and security policies and instruments are not clarified and adjusted to the current international environment and to the EU's most recent institutional evolutions.
It should also be underlined here that the increasing involvement in security issues of an organisation such as the EU, which had a primarily economic focus, seems to indicate a new and growing phenomenon on the international scene. This is confirmed, for instance, by similar evolutions in Africa, where organisations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) or the Southern African Development Community (SADC), whose original agendas were essentially driven by economic concerns, are now increasingly involved in conflict management.
IDS WORKING PAPER 284 32 75 The British even go further in insisting that there is no need to create a new coordination mechanism since the Political-Military Group is already seen as a 'clearing house', even if it is not currently acting as such.
76 The practice of negotiation within the EU pertains to a logic that is specific to the EU's governance mode: as shown by Marc Abélès (Abélès 1996; Abélès and Bellier 1996) , the dominant mode of political exchange at the European level is based on continuous negotiations, be they negotiations between the European institutions and external actors (states, pressure groups) or internal negotiations between the European institutions' staffs.
Above this and more importantly, the EU's policy in Africa is an interesting case study in how new international relations concepts -here the linkage between security, governance and development -can in reality be widely driven by institutional issues. Indeed, the linkage between security, governance and development, which informs the EU's current security policies in Africa, largely relies on institutional dynamics and national interests within the EU. This recently developed field has the potential to provide for the re-legitimisation of the EC's development policies, the experimentation and development of the ESDP and the Europeanisation of member-states' Africa and security policies. This three-fold process, however, also suggests far-reaching institutional ambitions and interests: African security triggers a competition between the different European institutions, eager to be the driving force for a policy that can offer some additional resources and autonomy. Meanwhile, the triangle formed by security, governance and development pre-supposes coordination and cooperation between these same institutions, which are little used to working together. Some of the inconsistencies observed in the field, when policies are actually implemented, can in turn be explained by this experimentation process and the inter-institutional dynamics it is linked to.
